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Abstract. Memory enhancing techniques, or mnemonics, are typically recommended in evidence-based investigative 
interviewing guidelines. In the current study, the use of a sketch mnemonic and its effect on the responses of truth tellers 
and liars was examined. Participants (n = 49) watched a mock intelligence operation video. They were instructed to 
tell the truth or lie about this operation in an interview immediately afterwards, and again after a two-week delay. In 
both interviews participants were requested to make a sketch of the place of the mock operation, and then to verbally 
describe the drawing. Results revealed that truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details 
than liars in the immediate interview. Truth tellers also reported more spatial, temporal and action details than liars in 
the delayed interview. Truth tellers experienced a decline in reporting action details after the delay, whereas liars did 
not show a decline in reporting any details over time. Thus, truth-tellers showed patterns of reporting indicative of 
genuine memory decay, whereas liars produced patterns reflecting a ‘stability bias’. Between-statement consistency 
was not different across veracity conditions. 
Keywords: Deception, sketch, consistency, repeated interviewing, memory decay.
Melo aptikimas neuždelstose ir vėlesnėse apklausose po įvykio: piešinio mnemoninės 
technikos vaidmuo
Santrauka. Prisiminimus palengvinančios technikos, arba mnemonika, įprastai įtraukiamos į įrodymais grįstas 
nusikaltimų tyrimo apklausų rekomendacijas. Eksperimento tikslas – nustatyti piešinio mnemoninės technikos įtaką 
teisingų ir melagingų pakartotinių parodymų pateikimui. Tiriamiesiems (teisingų parodymų, n = 25; melagingų 
parodymų, n = 24) buvo rodoma simuliacinės kriminalinės žvalgybos operacijos vaizdo medžiaga, o paskui jų buvo 
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prašoma sakyti tiesą arba meluoti dviejų apklausų – nedelsiant ir praėjus dviem savaitėms po įvykio – metu. Abiejų 
interviu metu apklausiamieji buvo paprašyti nupiešti vietos, kurioje vyko žvalgybos operacija, schemą ir verbaliai 
apibūdinti piešinį. Analizuotos parodymų turinio detalės ir nuoseklumo tarp parodymų charakteristikos. Teisinguose 
pasakojimuose iš karto po įvykio nustatyta reikšmingai daugiau vaizdinių, erdvinių, laiko ir veiksmo detalių negu 
melaginguose pasakojimuose. Teisinguose parodymuose pakartotinėse uždelstose apklausose taip pat buvo reikš-
mingai daugiau erdvinių, laiko ir veiksmo detalių negu melaginguose parodymuose. Tiesą sakantys tiriamieji pateikė 
mažiau veiksmo detalių parodymuose po dviejų savaičių negu pasakojimuose iš karto po įvykio; detalių skaičius 
melaginguose parodymuose abiejų apklausų metu reikšmingai nesiskyrė. Kitaip tariant, tiesą sakančiųjų atsakymuose 
labiau atsispindėjo natūralaus užmiršimo procesas negu meluojančiųjų atsakymuose tarp parodymų. Tiesą sakančių ir 
meluojančių asmenų informacijos pateikimo nuoseklumas tarp dviejų pasakojimų buvo panašus. Teorinės ir praktinės 
melo aptikimo implikacijos pateiktos straipsnyje.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: melo aptikimas, piešinio mnemonika, nuoseklumas, pakartotinės apklausos, užmiršimas.
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Obtaining a credible account is one of the main goals of investigative interviewing 
(Geiselman et al., 1984; Kebbel & Milne, 1998; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). However, legal 
professionals often raise questions about the credibility of an interviewee (witness, victim, 
suspect, or intelligence source) (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Volbert & Steller, 2014; 
Vrij, 2008). Deception research suggests that the richness of detail in a statement is one 
of the most diagnostic cues to credibility (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008, 2015), with 
truthful statements typically containing more details than deceptive statements. Whilst 
this difference in detail between truth tellers and liars occurs when people are interviewed 
immediately after experiencing an event (Vrij, 2005, 2008, 2016), the pattern of reporting 
may be different when people are interviewed after a delay. Truth tellers tend to forget 
information over time (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Lawson & London, 2015; Turtle & Yuille, 
1994) and experience the forgetting curve (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). Recent research sug-
gests that liars instead show a stability bias (Harvey, Vrij, Hope, Leal, & Mann, 2017), a 
metacognitive failure to correctly understand the degree to which memory can change over 
time (Kornell & Bjork, 2009). As a result, when truth tellers genuinely forget details and 
liars overestimate memory, both groups can become more similar in terms of the amount 
of information they provide after a delay, making the credibility assessment cue, richness 
of detail, less diagnostic (Harvey et al., 2017; McDougall & Bull, 2014; Vrij et al., 2009). 
In the current study, we examined the change in amount of detail reported over time by 
comparing immediate with delayed accounts across veracity conditions. 
Memory-based deception relates to memory issues (e.g., effects of time delay on 
retrieval of information) experienced by truth tellers, and whether liars are able to mimic 
genuine memory patterns. There are at least two reasons why it is important to examine 
memory-based deception in criminal interviewing contexts. First, in real life settings in-
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terviewees (witnesses, victims, suspects, or intelligence sources) are usually interviewed 
more than once (Pansky, Koriat, & Goldsmith, 2005; Wysman, Scoboria, Gawrylowicz, 
& Memon, 2014), and sometimes after long delay periods (Behrman & Davey, 2001; 
Read & Conolly, 2007). Second, a less detailed account as a result of decline in memory 
retrieval for original information can raise doubts about someone’s truthfulness, because 
the amount of information provided by an interviewee is a frequently used cue for assess-
ing credibility (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). 
Memory-enhancing techniques, also called mnemonics, could facilitate the retrieval 
of information even after long retention periods (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Mnemonic 
techniques have also been shown to be effective in detecting deceptive statements, because 
truth tellers and liars seem to respond to such mnemonics in different ways (Bembibre & 
Higueras, 2011; Hernández-Fernaud & Alonso-Quequty, 1997; Vrij et al., 2009). Although 
previous studies have addressed how mnemonic techniques affect truthful and deceptive 
accounts in single interviews, research on repeated and/or delayed statements is scarce. In 
this experiment we were interested in one mnemonic, making a sketch. Witnesses can initiate 
their own contextual retrieval cues when sketching the crime scene (Paulo, Albuquerque, 
& Bull, 2013). We examined how making a sketch affected immediate and delayed verbal 
accounts from truth tellers and liars. In addition, when repeated statements from the same 
interviewee have been considered, consistency between statements is an important cue for 
making credibility judgments (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, 
Strömwall, & Liu-Johnson, 2016; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). We also 
compared consistency between immediate and delayed accounts from truth tellers and liars.
To clarify how the sketch mnemonic was examined in the current study, we focused 
only on participants’ verbal descriptions of the drawings they made. We considered that 
the analysis of verbal details rather than of the sketch itself had higher practical relevance. 
If we imagine an applied setting in which sketching during an interview would be used, 
it is more likely to expect that the interviewer would ask the interviewee to explain the 
drawing, than to expect that the interviewer would try to analyse and interpret the drawing 
him/herself without asking the interviewee to explain the drawing. 
Sketching and Deception Detection
Mnemonic techniques are typically included in evidence-based investigative interviewing 
guidelines. Different mnemonics are an integral part of the Cognitive Interview (CI), an 
interview protocol that has been found to be more effective than standard interviewing 
techniques at eliciting accurate and complete accounts (Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 
2005; Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Mnemonic 
techniques take into account two basic principles of human memory: (1) A memory trace 
has distinct features and the effectiveness of a retrieval may be dependent on the similarity 
between the retrieval cue and the encoded event (Bower, 1967; Flexser & Tulving, 1978); 
and (2) several retrieval paths to the encoded event may be available; therefore, informa-
tion not accessible with one retrieval cue may be accessible with another (Tulving, 1974). 
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We examined the sketch technique for two reasons. First, sketching could have more 
practical value than some other mnemonics (for example, traditional mental reinstate-
ment of context) in real life forensic applications. It can be less cognitively demanding 
for an interviewer to administer a sketch instruction than to formulate questions, and can 
be protective against incompatible, suggestive/leading questions or retrieval cues during 
interviews (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009; Vrij et al., 2010). In one study, the sketch 
instruction resulted in shorter interviews and, in terms of memory performance, was as 
effective as the mental reinstatement of context instruction, and more effective than a 
standard questioning procedure (Dando et al., 2009). In another study, a sketch produced 
less confabulations in interviewees’ accounts than standard ‘question-answer’ interviewing 
approaches (Dando, Wilcock, Behnkle, & Milne, 2011). Similar results were found for a 
sample of alleged child victims of sexual abuse. Children in the drawing condition disclosed 
more central details about people, actions, times, and locations of the abusive events than 
children in the standard interviewing condition (Katz & Hershkowitz, 2010). The sketch 
mnemonic was also positively evaluated by practitioners. In one study, intelligence of-
ficers perceived sketching as one of the most effective components of the CI in eliciting 
information from sources (Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014). Additionally, in 
another study most of police officers (appr. 68%) reported having used drawings at least 
once in their practice to determine veracity in a suspect interview (Deeb et al., 2018). 
Second, sketching could be helpful in deception detection because truth tellers should 
benefit more from specific spatial memory enhancement techniques than liars. The sketch 
mnemonic should facilitate the retrieval of information for truth tellers. In contrast, liars 
may lack the imagination or be reluctant to reveal as much information as truth tellers 
because of the risk that it can be checked by the police (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, 
Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 2016). In addition, liars tend to plan interviews by antici-
pating certain questions and preparing answers to them. They may find an interviewer’s 
request to draw unexpected and, therefore, cognitively demanding to provide detailed 
accounts after such a request (Vrij et al., 2009). 
Previous research suggests that sketching aids in eliciting information about the event 
in question and leads to a better discrimination between truthful and deceptive accounts 
than standard questions (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2018; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 
2012). A review of sketching studies has shown that, in general, this task can promote 
differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of provided information 
(Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vernham, 2017). Moreover, the recent studies have shown the 
benefits of using sketch in interpreter-based investigative interviews (Vrij et al., 2018; 
Vrij et al., 2019).
However, it is as yet unknown what type of information in a sketch will differentiate 
truth tellers from liars the most. In theory, the request to sketch a layout of a crime scene 
not only forces an interviewee to reveal visual details of objects and/or people, but also to 
indicate the spatial location of these objects/people (Vrij et al., 2012). Thus, truth-tellers’ 
memory retrieval of visual or spatial information should be facilitated (Fisher & Geisel-
man, 1992). Regarding liars’ accounts, sketching can create problems for them because 
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sketching and describing specific objects at specific locations increases the risk of getting 
caught (Vrij et al., 2012). Therefore, liars may decide to avoid mentioning some visual 
and spatial details in their accounts.
The current experiment is an elaboration of Izotovas et al. (2018). In that study, three 
different mnemonic techniques (context reinstatement, sketch, or event-line) and their 
effects on the immediate and delayed statements of truth tellers and liars were exam-
ined. It was found that in each of three conditions immediate as well as delayed truthful 
statements contained more details than deceptive statements. However, in that study the 
immediate interview consisted of two parts, a free recall phase and a mnemonic phase. 
Therefore, it was unclear whether the differences between truth tellers and liars in the 
delayed statements were affected by the free recall, the mnemonic technique or both. In 
the current study, we directly tested the effects of a mnemonic technique (sketch) on the 
delayed statements of truth tellers and liars.
Sketching and consistency as a cue to deceit
Both laypeople and legal professionals believe that consistency is indicative of truth-
telling and inconsistency indicative of lying (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2000). However, research has shown that liars can be equally or 
even more consistent in their statements than truth tellers (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Vredeveldt et al., 2014). This can be explained by the dif-
ferent strategies commonly used by truth tellers and liars during investigative interviews. 
The ‘repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis’ illustrates the relationship between consistency and 
deception (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). This hypothesis is based on two assumptions. 
First, liars believe that being consistent is important for making an honest impression. 
They are therefore keen to repeat their original story when interviewed again. Second, 
truth tellers are comparatively less concerned with being consistent (Hartwig, Granhag, 
& Strömwall, 2007; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). For each interview 
session, it is most likely that truth tellers simply try to remember the event and, due to the 
reconstructive nature of human memory, add, omit or alter details in a repeated retrieval 
attempt (Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 2010). 
Deception research using sketches and how they affect consistency in truth tellers’ 
and liars’ accounts is limited. In one study, truth tellers and liars were interviewed about 
a lunch they supposedly had in a nearby restaurant (Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 
2011). They were asked to sketch the layout of the restaurant and to answer a few spatial 
questions. The consistency between verbal reports and sketches made by truth tellers and 
liars was examined. Liars where less consistent than truth tellers and more than 80% of 
truth tellers and 70% of liars were classified correctly based on their consistency scores 
(Leins et al., 2011). In another study, it was found that drawings elicited less consistent 
answers from pairs of deceptive suspects than from pairs of truthful suspects, whereas no 
difference in consistency was found in some verbal responses (Vrij et al., 2009). In another 
experiment, adolescent participants had to either tell the truth or lie in groups of three 
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about an alleged event (Roos af Hjelmäster, Öhman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014). The differ-
ence in consistency between truth tellers and liars was larger for the sketch task than for 
the verbal descriptions, and triads of liars were less consistent than triads of truth tellers. 
It is important to consider that, depending on the interview style, consistency can be 
either a cue of deceit or a cue of truthfulness (Leins et al., 2010). When a passive inter-
view style is employed (e.g. asking a suspect the same questions from one interview to 
another), liars are more consistent than truth tellers as a result of liars’ strategies (e.g. 
planning interviewers’ questions and foreseeing answers to them; Hartwig et al., 2007), 
and the nature of truth tellers’ memory (Schacter, 1999). In contrast, active interview styles 
(e.g. asking unanticipated questions, changing interviewing modes from verbal to picto-
rial descriptions) constrains liars from using the ‘repeat’ strategy and typically induces 
inconsistent answers (Leins et al., 2011). Therefore, consistency becomes a diagnostic 
cue of credibility. 
Statement characteristics 
Details in the statements of truth tellers and liars were derived from the Reality Monitor-
ing approach (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981). Based on this approach, real memories are 
usually clearer, sharper, and more vivid than deceptive stories, which typically contain 
less detail and are vaguer and less concrete (Vrij, 2015). 
For the current study, frequencies of different types of detail were compared: visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details. Such details are often examined in deception research 
(Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2015). The nature of (in)consistency 
between truthful and deceptive statements was also compared. Reminiscences (details 
mentioned in a later, but not in a previous statement), repetitions (details repeated across 
statements) and omissions (details mentioned in a previous, but not in a later statement) as 
characteristics of between-statement consistency were analysed (Granhag & Strömwall, 
2002), which has been defined as consistency between different statements made by one 
person (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). 
In this experiment, all participants made a sketch, which they subsequently described. 
We were interested in the differences between truth tellers and liars in the contents of 
their descriptions in immediate and delayed interviews. We expected truth tellers to report 
more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the immediate accounts 
(Hypothesis 1). Our following two hypotheses were derived from previous findings 
(Izotovas et al., 2018). As truth tellers could sketch and report these details (i.e., have 
memory practice) in a sketch, we further predicted truth tellers to report more visual and 
spatial details than liars after a delay (Hypothesis 2). We expected truth tellers, but not 
liars, to show a memory decline in temporal and action details after a delay. Truth tellers 
would show a decline in such details because of a lack of practicing temporal and action 
details in sketch descriptions (Hypothesis 3). Regarding between-statement consistency 
characteristics, we considered our interviewing approach as passive. Although we requested 
participants to sketch the layout of an incident, only verbal descriptions of the sketches 
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were examined. Moreover, participants were asked the same question twice. In line with 
the reasoning above, we predicted truth tellers to be less consistent than liars: to include 
the same number of repetitions, but more reminiscences and omissions than liars in the 
delayed interviews (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants. A total of 49 university students took part in the study. Their mean age 
was M = 19.65 years (SD = 3.36) and 79.6% were female. Participants were recruited 
via posters, flyers, the online participant pool system, and online advertisements on the 
University’s staff portals. As the experiment focused on the verbal content of the state-
ments, native English speakers were prioritised to take part. The majority of participants 
(93.9%) were English native speakers and the remaining participants were fluent in English. 
Participants were awarded with two course credits or £10 after they completed the experi-
ment. In addition, all participants were entered into a draw to win a single prize worth 
£150 after completion of data collection for this study. The experiment was accepted by 
the Science Faculty Ethics Committee of the University.
Design. A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs deceptive) X 2 (Time of Interview: Immediate vs 
delayed) experimental design was used with Veracity as between-subjects factor and Time 
of Interview as within-subjects factor. Dependent variables were visual, spatial, temporal, 
and action details. Interviewees were randomly assigned as truth tellers (n = 25) or liars 
(n = 24). All participants were interviewed on two occasions, immediately after the stimulus 
event and two weeks later. As not all participants were available exactly 14 days after the 
first interview, the delay period for the second interview varied between 12 and 18 days 
(M = 13.90, SD = 0.82, Mode = 14 (81.6% of cases). The delay period between truth 
tellers (M = 13.84, SD = 0.55, 95% CI [13.61, 14.05]) and liars (M = 13.96, SD = 1.04, 
95% CI [13.58, 14.43]) was not significantly different, t(47) = 0.50, p = .620, d = .14. 
Materials. Stimulus event. Participants watched a video showing a simulated break-
in1. They were instructed to take the role of an intelligence officer working undercover 
with another officer. They were told their task was to break into an apartment and secure 
some important information for intelligence gathering. This special task was recorded from 
the perspective of the participant who followed the other intelligence officer throughout 
the break-in. To minimise the possibility of liars telling an embedded lie (for example, 
by describing the apartment they genuinely lived in), all interviewees were told that the 
apartment they broke into was a staff room of a community centre.  
The video, lasting five minutes, shows a man entering a basement floor from the 
outside of the building. He then walks about ten metres through the corridor and tries to 
break into one of the doors at the end of the corridor. After a couple of attempts to open 
the door, he walks into the room. The man in the video searches the room thoroughly and 
1  The video was used with the permission of the Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau. The video was created by 
police practitioners and used at the investigative interviewing trainings for criminal police officers.  
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takes two mobile phones from a desk, some jewellery, a laptop, a driving licence, a debit 
card and some cash in Euros and dollars from a wallet. He then leaves the room with 
these items. As the man walks through the corridor on his way out, a neighbour witnesses 
him leaving. When the officer goes outside, he briefly looks around by the building exit. 
Finally, he leaves.
Procedure. Pre-interview phase. After watching the break-in video participants were 
randomly assigned to the truth telling or lying condition. Truth tellers were told that the 
break-in was successful and that they would be interviewed by a fellow agent to continue 
the intelligence investigation. They were asked to tell the truth during the interview about 
1) the interior of the staff room in the video, and 2) what they took from there. Liars where 
also told that the break-in was successful. However, they were told that they would be 
interviewed by an agent of a hostile organisation and that their task was to create a con-
vincing cover story because if the hostile officer came to know where exactly they broke 
in and exactly what was taken from the apartment, the entire investigation would be in 
danger. Therefore, liars were instructed to tell the hostile officer that they broke into a 
different staff room in a different community centre. They had to lie about 1) the interior 
of the apartment in the video, and 2) what they took from there. To increase participants’ 
motivation to be convincing in the interviews, they were told that if they were convincing 
during the interview, they would receive two course credits or £10 and would only be 
entered in the draw to win £150 worth prize. Participants were also informed about the 
consequences for not being believed in the interviews. Specifically, they were told that if 
the interviewer thought that they did not report everything they remembered, they would 
only receive one course credit or £5, would be excluded from the draw, and would be 
asked to write a full statement of what happened in the video.
After the instructions to tell the truth or lie, participants were requested to prepare for 
the interview. They were given unlimited preparation time. After preparation, they were 
given a pre-interview questionnaire. Truth tellers and liars were requested to respond 
truthfully. In the questionnaire participants were asked to rate on 7-point scales their 
preparation for the interview. They were asked to indicate how well they were prepared 
(1 = very poor, 7 = very good) and how sufficient (1 = insufficient, 7 = sufficient); and 
complete (1 = incomplete, 7 = complete) their preparation was. These three preparation 
items were clustered into one variable, Preparation quality (Cronbach’s alpha is .91 for 
the immediate and .93 for the delayed interviews). The pre-interview questionnaire also 
included questions about stress, motivation, and confidence the participants felt about 
being convincing in the upcoming interview. These answers were rated on 7-point scales 
(1 = not at all, 7 = totally). 
Interviews. Sketch Task. One interviewer, blind to the aims of the study, stimulus 
material, and veracity conditions, questioned the participants. In the beginning of the im-
mediate interview truth tellers and liars were asked to sketch the layout of the community 
centre they broke into. The participants made their drawing on an A3 sized blank sheet 
of paper. All participants were asked to use pencils; erasers were provided. They were 
requested to use as much space as they needed to sketch the scene as they remembered 
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it. Participants were instructed to include as many details as possible about where differ-
ent objects were in relation to other objects. They could also use labels and notes within 
their sketch to indicate the features of the scene or to indicate if they were not certain of 
something. Participants were given unlimited time to complete the sketch. After making 
the sketch, participants were asked to describe their sketch in as much detail as possible. 
After the immediate interview all participants were told that the second part of the 
experiment would be in two weeks’ time. When they came back for the second session, 
participants were again given the same sketch task, and, afterwards, asked to verbally 
describe their sketch. 
Post-interview questionnaire. Participants were asked to fill out a post-interview 
questionnaire after the delayed interview only. The post-interview questionnaire included 
questions about what they thought the likelihood was of getting two credits or £10 and 
having to write a statement (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). As previous research has found 
that active repetition of learned information can prevent memory decline (Bornstein, Li-
ebel, & Sarberry, 1998), we also asked participants in an open-ended question how many 
times they had tried to remember the break-in (truth tellers)/cover story (liars) between 
the two interviews. Lastly, we asked participants about the extent to which they i) told 
the truth, and ii) lied during the interview. Participants indicated on 11-point Likert scales 
ranging from 0% (not at all) to 100% (totally). These two questions were asked twice 
to assess the truthfulness in both the immediate and delayed descriptions of sketch. As 
with the pre-interview questionnaire, truth tellers and liars were requested to be honest 
with their responses.
After completing the post-interview questionnaire, all participants were thanked, fully 
debriefed, and paid £10 or given two credits for participation in the experiment. After full 
data collection, one participant was randomly selected as a lottery winner.  
Coding. Verbal details. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. All statements were 
coded for the details provided by interviewees in the 1) immediate sketch description and 
2) delayed sketch description. Each detail was counted once per description of sketch. For 
example, if the same word ‘desk’ (or a synonym) was mentioned twice in one interview 
(and had the meaning of the same ‘desk’), it was counted only once. However, if the same 
detail was mentioned in the different interviews, it was counted separately. Four types 
of detail were coded: i) visual details: specific items/description of items seen by inter-
viewee. For example, ‘We1 found a small2 leather3 wallet4’ contains four visual details; 
ii) spatial details: information about locations or spatial arrangements of people or objects. 
For example, ‘There was a sofa on the left handside1 next to2 the door, and a table in the 
middle 3’ contains three spatial details; iii) temporal details: reference to the sequence of 
activities, their duration, or information when something happened: ‘After1 we entered 
there and spent fifteen minutes2 in a room, we quickly3 ran through the corridor’ contains 
three temporal details; and iv) action details: information about the actions carried out by 
people in the event: ‘He took1 a wallet, mobile phones, we then moved2 to the kitchen area 
and searched3 inside the cupboards’ contains three action details. This coding system is 
derived from the Reality Monitoring (RM) approach (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Vrij, 2015). 
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Two coders carried out the coding. Both coders were trained by a senior member in 
the research lab. They received definitions and examples of the to-be-coded variables and 
were asked to code some practice statements. The trainer gave feedback on the coding 
and gave the coders a few more practice statements. The coders were given permission 
to start coding the study interviews when the trainer was satisfied with their coding of 
the practice statements.
The first coder, the first author of this study, coded all transcripts. The second coder, 
blind to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the statements, coded a random 
sample of 12 interview scripts (24.5%) to measure reliability. Inter-rater reliabilities be-
tween the two coders for the frequency of detail in both (immediate and delayed) statements 
were measured via intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC revealed satisfactory 
inter-rater values: .76, for visual details; .87, for spatial details; .63, for temporal details; 
and .83, for action details. As obtained ICC for temporal details is moderate, the results 
for this type of detail should be interpreted with caution. 
Between-statement consistency. Consistency in the responses between the immediate 
and delayed verbal descriptions of sketch was measured. The details coded previously were 
used for consistency analysis. The total amount of details (visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details combined) was examined. Repetitions (details reported in both immediate 
and delayed interviews), reminiscences (details reported in the delayed interview but not in 
the immediate interview), and omissions (details reported in the immediate interview but 
not in the delayed interview) were analysed. For example, the statements ‘my colleague 
found a Samsung cell phone on the wooden desk’ (immediate report) and ‘my colleague 
found a phone and a laptop on the table’ (delayed report) would produce four repetitions 
(my colleague, found, phone, and desk/table), two omissions (wooden, and Samsung), 
and one reminiscence (laptop). The amount of contradictions, the fourth measure of con-
sistency, was not examined in this study. Contradictions do not occur frequent enough in 
most experimental deception research to be used in the statistical analyses (e.g. Granhag 
& Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2016; Deeb et al., 2016).
The coders only coded reminiscences. Arithmetic calculations were used to obtain 
repetitions and omissions. Reminiscent details in the delayed interview were coded, if 
they were not present in the immediate interview. Repetitions were computed by deduct-
ing reminiscences from the total amount of details in the delayed interview and omissions 
were calculated by deducting repetitions from the total amount of details in the immediate 
interview. 
Again, two coders were used for the consistency coding. The consistency training they 
received followed a similar format as the training they received for the details coding. 
The first author marked all transcripts and the second coder marked 11 interview scripts, 
22%. We examined inter-rater reliability for reminiscences only because that was the only 
measure coded manually. The analysis revealed high ICC of .87 for reminiscences in the 
delayed vs. immediate reports.
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Results
Manipulation checks
Mixed ANOVAs with Time of Interview as the within-subject factor and Veracity as the 
between-subjects factor were used for all the manipulation checks. Table 1 shows mean 
scores, standard deviations and confidence intervals for truth tellers and liars to the pre- 
and post- questionnaires.
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for the answers to pre-interview 
and post-interview questionnaires by truth-tellers and liars
Measure
Truth tellers Liars
M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
Motivation to convince the 
interviewer 6.04 0.72 5.77,6.30 5.96 1.00 5.52,6.39
Preparation quality 4.96 0.80 4.67,5.24 4.85 1.27 4.29,5.37
Preparation time (sec.) 198.85 98.27 165.56,234.03 207.34 78.82 174.87,243.26
Stress before the interview 3.39 1.33 2.90,3.93 4.35 1.37 3.77,4.96
Confidence to convince the 
interviewer 5.17 1.01 4.78,5.56 4.40 1.19 3.92,4.90
Likelihood to receive £10/2 
credits 5.23 1.21 4.73,5.71 4.67 1.13 4.21,5.12
Likelihood to write a state-
ment 3.46 1.48 2.86,4.06 4.17 1.31 3.63,4.65
Times thought about the 
event/story 2.19 1.27 1.73,2.67 3.13 1.67 2.48,3.76
Extent of truthfulness in the 
immediate interview 98.46 6.13 95.83,100.00 18.26 18.50 11.82,24.44
Extent of truthfulness in the 
delayed interview 98.92 6.24 94.49,99.11 17.50 19.39 10.45,24.46
There was a significant main effect of Veracity on self-reported stress levels, F(1, 
47) = 6.44, p = .014, d = 0.72. Liars reported feeling a higher level of stress than the truth 
tellers did. There was also a significant main effect of Veracity on confidence in convinc-
ing the interviewer, F(1, 47) = 7.54, p = .016, d = 0.65. Truth tellers felt more confident 
than liars in their ability to convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth. A 
significant main effect of Veracity was found on how many times interviewees thought 
about the event/story before the second interview, F(1, 46) = 3.41, p = .028, d = 0.63)2. 
Liars thought more often about the event than truth tellers. There were also significant 
main effects of Veracity on extent of truthfulness during the immediate interview, F(1, 
47) = 52.10, p < .001, d = 5.8, and the delayed interview, F(1, 46) = 91.90, p < .001, 
2  When this variable was introduced as a covariate in the analyses, there was no significant effect in the delayed 
statement on Total detail, F(1, 44) = 1.93, p = .172,  = .04, Reminiscences, F(1, 44) = 0.25, p = .620,   = .01, 
Repetitions, F(1, 44) = 3.64, p = .063,  = .08, or Omissions, F(1, 44) = 0.11, p = .744,  = .002.  
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d = 5.57. In both interviews, truth tellers were more truthful than liars. All other main 
effects of Veracity were not significant, all F’s < 9.14, all p’s > .165, see Table 1.
A main effect of Time of Interview emerged only for preparation time, F(1, 46) = 14.80, 
p < .001, d = 0.59. Participants used more preparation time before the immediate interview 
(M = 234.14, SD = 99.69, 95% CI [208.54, 260.49]) than before the delayed interview 
(M = 178.45, SD = 99.69, 95% CI [154.14, 201.83]). All other main effects of Time of 
Interview were non-significant, all F’s < 3.70, all p’s > .060. All Veracity x Time of Inter-
view interaction main effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.45, p > .234.
An independent t test revealed no significant main effect of Veracity on incentive ratings. 
Truth-tellers were equally convinced as liars about getting a £10/2 credits reward, F(1, 
38) = 0.02, p = .10, d = 0.48. Finally, an independent t test revealed no significant main 
effect of Veracity on the likelihood of writing a statement ratings, F(1, 38) = 1.89, p = .10, 
d = 0.49, see Table 1 (In the two latter analyses time of interview was not included as a 
factor as the question referred to the two interviews combined). In summary, the results 
showed that manipulations in this study were successful. 
Verbal details in the immediate and delayed interviews 
To examine whether the amount of information changed between the immediate and delayed 
interviews, mixed ANOVAs were carried out with Time of Interview as the within-subject 
factor and Veracity as the between-subjects factor. With visual details as dependent vari-
able, there was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 47) = 6.73, p = .013, d = 0.74, 
with truth tellers (M = 106.56, SD = 46.58, 95% CI [89.73, 126.19]) reporting more visual 
details than liars (M = 75.79, SD = 35.31, 95% CI [62.17, 91.80]). The main effect of Time 
of Interview, F(1, 47) = 0.05, p = .817, d = 0.03, and Veracity x Time of Interview interac-
tion, F(1, 47) = 3.95, p = .053,  = .08, were not significant. Simple effects analysis for 
Veracity revealed that truth tellers reported more visual details than liars in the immediate 
interview, whereas the difference was not significant in the delayed interview, see Table 
2. The other simple effects for Veracity or Time of Interview did not reach significance. 




M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI
Immediate interview
Visual 55.68 27.19 45.87,67.36 36.00 16.27 30.30,41.50 5.15 .004 0.88
Spatial 29.24 16.51 23.36,36.22 13.00 7.47 10.43,15.64 9.47 <.001 1.27
Temporal 7.60 9.69 4.28,11.90 1.25 1.87 .63,1.96 19.81 .003 0.91
Action 18.04 20.68 10.90,27.00 3.04 4.51 1.59,4.56 28.69 .002 1.00
Delayed interview
Visual 50.88 20.90 43.55,58.92 39.79 22.38 32.11,48.47 .57 .079 0.51
Spatial 27.16 14.77 22.44,32.70 15.54 9.54 11.96,19.18 2.91 .002 0.93
Temporal 7.16 10.24 4.00,10.76 1.54 2.62 .57,2.70 9.91 .013 0.75
Action 14.80 16.32 9.39,21.20 3.88 4.91 2.00,6.04 13.12 .003 0.91
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A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for reporting spatial details, F(1, 
47) = 15.97, p < .001, d = 1.15. Truth tellers (M = 56.40, SD = 30.47, 95% CI [45.54, 
68.92]) reported more spatial details than liars (M = 28.54, SD = 15.73, 95% CI [22.30, 
35.50]). The main effect of Time of Interview was not significant, F(1, 47) = 0.05, p = .820, 
d = 0.01, but the Veracity x Time of Interview interaction effect, F(1, 47) = 5.27, p = .026,
 = .10, was significant. Simple effects showed that truth tellers reported more spatial 
details than liars in both the immediate and delayed interviews (Table 2). 
A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for temporal details, F(1, 47) = 8.50, 
p = .005, d = 0.84. Truth tellers (M = 14.76, SD = 19.74, 95% CI [8.05, 23.86]) reported 
more temporal details than liars (M = 2.79, SD = 3.91, 95% CI [1.30, 4.39]). The Time of 
Interview main effect, F(1, 47) = 0.04, p = .840, = .01, and Veracity x Time of Interview 
interaction effect , F(1, 47) = 1.00, p = .323,  = .02, were not significant. Simple effects 
revealed that truth tellers reported more temporal details than liars in both the immediate 
and delayed interviews (Table 2). 
A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for action details, F(1, 47) = 10.78, 
p = .001, d = 0.98. Truth tellers (M = 32.84, SD = 36.47, 95% CI [20.12, 48.87]) mentioned 
more action details (M = 6.92, SD = 8.56, 95% CI [3.81, 10.21]) than liars. The Time 
of Interview main effect was not significant, F(1, 47) = 1.89, p = .176, d = .08, but the 
Veracity x Time of Interview interaction effect was significant, F(1, 47) = 5.42, p = .024,
 = .10. Simple effects revealed that truth tellers provided more action details than liars 
in both the immediate and delayed interviews, see Table 2. 
In summary, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, truth tellers reported significantly more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the immediate statements, with 
large Cohen’s d effect sizes for independent samples ranging from 0.88 to 1.21. Truth tell-
ers also reported significantly more spatial, temporal, and action details after a delay. The 
effect sizes samples were again large, ranging from 0.75 to 0.93. There was no difference 
between truth tellers and liars in the amount of visual details after a delay. Thus, Hypothesis 
2 was supported for spatial details, but rejected for visual, temporal, and action details. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a memory decline in truth tellers for temporal and action details 
after a delay. Truth tellers showed a significant decline in reporting action details, F(1, 
47) = 7.00, p = .045, d = .42 (Cohen’s d for paired samples), but no difference in reporting 
visual, spatial, and temporal details emerged between immediate and delayed statements, 
all F’s < 2.52, p’s > .088, d’s < 0.38. There was no difference between liars’ immediate 
and delayed statements in the amount of any type of (visual, spatial, temporal, action) 
detail, all F’s < 3.13, p’s > .080, d’s < 0.37. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported for action 
details, but rejected for temporal details. 
Reporting patterns of different type of details over time in the statements of truth tellers 
and liars are shown in Figure 1. Although not significant (except for action details), truth 
tellers showed a tendency to report a lower amount of details in the delayed than in the 
immediate interviews. In contrast, liars showed a non-significant tendency to report more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the delayed than in the immediate interviews.
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To confirm overall patterns of reporting details over time, we considered it impor-
tant to examine the effects on total details across veracity groups. A mixed ANOVA 
was carried out with Time of Interview as the within-subject factor and Veracity as the 
between-subjects factor and total details as the dependent variable. There was a sig-
nificant Veracity x Interview interaction main effect for total details, F(1, 47) = 6.30, 
p = .016,  = .12. Truth tellers reported significantly more total details in the immediate 
statements (M = 110.56, SD = 70.87, 95% CI [86.57, 140.43]) than in the delayed state-
ments (M = 99.96, SD = 58.79, 95% CI [79.58, 123.75]), t(24) = 2.26, p = .034, d = .45. 
Liars showed no difference in reporting total details between the immediate statements 
(M = 53.46, SD = 25.15, 95% CI [43.56, 62.96]) and delayed statements (M = 60.75, 



















Figure 1. Total amount of different details with 95% confidence intervals in the immediate and 
delayed statements across veracity conditions.
Consistency between the immediate and delayed interviews. An ANCOVA with 
Veracity as the between-subjects factor was conducted with reminiscent details as the de-
pendent variable and amount of detail provided at the immediate interview as a covariate. 
The reason for including this covariate was that the number of reminiscent details in the 
delayed interview is related to the amount of detail provided in the immediate interview. 
That is, the more detail provided in the immediate interview, the less opportunity there is 
to add new additional detail in the delayed interview. The main effect of Veracity was not 
significant, F(1, 45) = 1.89, p = .176, d = .54. Truth tellers (M = 18.41, SD = 25.20, 95% 
CI [13.41, 23.76]) and liars (M = 30.71, SD = 36.20, 95% CI [17.46, 53.60]) provided a 
similar number of reminiscent details in the delayed interview. 
The same ANCOVA with repetitions in the delayed interview as dependent variable and 
amount of detail provided at immediate interview as covariate did not result in a signifi-
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cant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 46) = 0.20, p = .654, d = .22. Truth tellers (M = 59.41, 
SD = 14.65, 95% CI [46.90, 73.28]) and liars (M = 55.43, SD = 21.07, 95% CI [43.12, 
68.82]) reported a similar number of repetitions in the delayed interview. 
The ANCOVA with omissions as the dependent variable and Total detail at the immedi-
ate interview as covariate showed no significant effect of Veracity either, F(1, 46) = 0.20, 
p = .654, d = .22. Truth tellers (M = 23.12, SD = 14.65, 95% CI [16.06, 30.37]) and liars 
(M = 27.17, SD = 21.07, 95% CI [20.28, 37.18]) omitted a similar number of details in 
the delayed interview3. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Discussion
Manipulation checks. The results showed that most of main manipulations were successful 
and were in line with deception literature (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al.). That is, liars 
prepared before the interviews and did so not shorter than truth tellers. Participants were 
highly motivated to convince the interviewer. This is a critical requirement to elicit differ-
ences between truth tellers and liars (DePaulo et al., 2003). Finally, liars felt more stress 
than truth tellers indicating that deception is mentally challenging task (Vrij et al., 2017). 
Hypotheses testing. In this experiment, we examined the effects of a sketch mnemonic 
on immediate and delayed statements of truth tellers and liars. Analysing the immediate 
descriptions of the sketch, we found that truth tellers reported significantly more visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details than liars. This result is in line with previous findings 
showing that truth tellers, especially when interviewed immediately after an event, report 
more information than liars (Vrij, 2005, 2008, 2016).
In the delayed sketch descriptions, we found that truth tellers provided more spatial, 
but not more visual details than liars. Moreover, the statements of truth tellers were 
comparatively richer in terms of temporal and action details than the liars’ statements. 
Two conclusions can be derived from the findings for the delayed statements. First, 
the credibility cue richness of detail remained diagnostic after a delay (except for visual 
details). These findings differed from those obtained in some other studies (e.g., Harvey 
et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2009) in which truth tellers did differ from liars in the amount of 
information provided when interviewed immediately, but not after a delay. Noteworthy, 
in those studies participants were interviewed only once, and no mnemonic was used. 
Thus, the presence of an immediate interview and/or the use of a mnemonic may have 
strengthened memory in truth tellers and, subsequently, made richness of detail a diagnostic 
cue to deceit even in delayed interviews. 
3  When the amount of total detail in the immediate interview was not included as a covariate, an independent t 
tests revealed that truth tellers (M = 19.44, SD = 11.39, 95% CI [15.38, 23.80]) and liars (M = 24.63, SD = 31.13, 
95% CI [14.86, 38.56]) reported a similar number of reminiscent details in the delayed interview, F(1, 47) = 0.61, 
p = .439, d = 0.22. Truth tellers (M = 80.52, SD = 55.87, 95% CI [59.54, 104.69]) provided significantly more repeti-
tions than liars (M = 36.13, SD = 18.68, 95% CI [28.87, 43.89]) in the delayed interview, F(1, 47) = 13.68, p = .001, 
d = 1.07. Also, truth tellers (M = 30.04, SD = 24.20, 95% CI [21.19, 39.96]) made significantly more omissions than 
liars (M = 17.33, SD = 11.98, 95% CI [12.75, 21.52] in the delayed interview, F(1, 47) = 5.35, p = .025, d = 0.67.    
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Second, the absence of a difference in the amount of visual details across veracity 
conditions in the delayed interviews could be explained by different reporting strategies. 
Truth tellers might have been forthcoming in their delayed statements and simply told 
what they remembered. Liars might have found it easier to report more visual details 
than the other types of detail. Providing visual information is relatively safe as it does 
not give too many leads to investigators and implicate the interviewee. For example, liars 
can provide visual details that are typically found in a staff room e.g. information about 
furniture, kitchen utensils, or electric devices. Accounts with such information are less 
likely to contradict the factual evidence. However, reporting too many spatial, temporal 
or action details might have put liars at risk of revealing self-incriminating evidence. For 
example, information about locations of objects, specific times and/or activities can be 
potentially checked by investigators (e.g. CCTV records or asking neighbours who could 
have witnessed the event in question). It is known that liars tend to avoid reporting self-
incriminating evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). More research is needed to support 
this explanation with more confidence.
In Hypothesis 2, we expected differences between truth tellers and liars for the amount 
of visual and spatial details only in the delayed interview. However, truth tellers also 
reported more temporal and action details than liars after the delay. Immediate retrieval 
practice of these details could strengthen truth tellers’ recall for temporal and action details 
after the delay. However, this explanation should be interpreted with caution because the 
study did not contain a control group.
We further found that truth tellers showed a significant decline in providing action and 
total details between the immediate and delayed interviews. Liars showed no decrease 
in reporting any type of details in this study. It supports the evidence that truth tellers 
experienced genuine decline in memory over time (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913; Penrod et 
al., 1982; Schacter, 1999), whereas liars failed to take into account genuine memory de-
cay and produced the reporting pattern reflecting a ‘stability bias’ (Harvey et al., 2017). 
Noteworthy, truth tellers demonstrated no decline in visual, spatial, and temporal details 
after a delay. It can be speculated that the decline in temporal details could happen because 
this type of information may be more difficult to retrieve from memory than the other 
details. For example, it could be challenging to remember specific actions of the event in 
question after the delay. Nevertheless, truth tellers still reported significantly more action 
details than liars after the delay. Closer observation of the number of temporal and action 
details reported by liars after the delay (Figure 1) shows that they provided only minimal 
amount of these details. It could be explained by the typical (avoidant) strategies used by 
liars (‘keep the story simple’) (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008).
Finally, there was no difference in between-statement consistency across veracity 
conditions. As in previous research (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Vredeveldt et al. 2014, 
Granhag et al., 2016), our experiment showed that truth tellers and liars were equally 
consistent in their statements. This finding is in contrast with the widely held stereotypical 
view that truth tellers are more consistent than liars (Bogaard et al., 2016). Two explana-
tions can be derived from the lack of difference in consistency between truth tellers and 
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liars in their repeated statements. First, truth tellers could not only add or omit, but also 
repeat a lot of details because their immediate and delayed statements were rich in detail, 
in general.  Second, and in line with previous research (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012), liars 
may not experience difficulty in being consistent between their statements because a pas-
sive interviewing style (identical request of making a sketch during both interviews) was 
employed in this study. We did not change the modes of interview, therefore, liars were 
not constrained to use the ‘repeat’ strategy during the delayed interview. 
Limitations and methodological considerations. Primarily, this study emphasised the 
quantity of details reported by truth-tellers and liars. We did not examine the quality of 
details in the accounts. Thus, there is a risk that truth-tellers could provide more details in 
their stories at the expense of the accuracy of those details. However, we believe truthful 
statements were not dramatically inflated by false details. First, witness memory research 
showed that immediate, non-suggestive retrieval practice inoculated memory against inac-
curate information at future repeated retrieval attempts (Gabbert, Hope, Carter, Boon, & 
Fisher, 2016; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). Second, consistency results showed that truth-
tellers reported mostly repetitions compared to reminiscences in the delayed interview. 
Specifically, based on the premise that truth tellers more likely reported most of the details 
in the immediate interview correctly, it is reasonable to assume that they did the same by 
repeating the details in the delayed interview. Third, in the post-interview self-reported 
responses, liars, compared to truth tellers, not only indicated that they fabricated more 
details, but also the majority of their statements contained falsified details (Table 1). 
Nevertheless, the accuracy of the details in the veracity groups is relevant to examine in 
the further deception studies. Especially for the situations when a liar chooses the strat-
egy of fabricating only a small part of the event in question (e.g., only the evidence that 
incriminates him/er) – a scenario that is plausible in the real world.
The majority of the study sample contained young female participants. Although we 
cannot think of theoretical reasons whether other groups would perform on the study tasks 
differently, a more representative sample would strengthen the findings of this experiment.
The rationale of using a two-week delay interval in this study is worthwhile to discuss. 
On the one hand, we considered that a shorter retention period (e.g., few days, or one-week) 
would not suffice to produce expected memory decay. On the other hand, an extended 
delay could cause practical issues, e.g., longer data collection time, or the availability of 
participants and/or research assistant(s) for the delayed interview.
The difference between the current experiment and Izotovas et al. (2018) was that 
in the current experiment we left out the immediate free recall. We still found that truth 
tellers were more detailed than liars after a delay, which shows that an initial free recall 
is not required for this effect. Still, we cannot say with certainty that the request to sketch 
caused the effect, it could also be the result of the retrieval practice associated with sketch-
ing. Research has shown that an immediate retrieval of information tends to strengthen 
episodic memory and facilitate later retrieval (Bjork, 1988; Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995; 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). This confound is in our view not problematic because in 
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interview settings the sketching procedure is introduced solely as a retrieval technique 
and serves no other purpose.
In addition, A3 paper format was chosen for sketching in the experiment. As this study 
was the elaboration of Izotovas et al. (2018), in which this format of the paper required, 
this was used for the sake of consistency. However, we speculate that large paper size 
should not corrupt deception detection. On the contrary, this condition could make the dif-
ferences between truth tellers and liars even larger because possibilities for the additional 
retrieval cues would be created for them. This assumption deserves further investigation. 
Further studies. In our experiment the first recall (the sketching) took part immediately 
after the participants witnessed the event. In real-life investigations, however, the first 
interview often occurs a long time after the incident. Further studies should address the 
effect of the sketch mnemonic in discriminating between truthful and deceptive accounts 
in such situations.  
Also, different type of details and how they change when reported repeatedly over time 
could be examined in future deception research using the sketch mnemonic. For example, 
someone could examine crime related vs. non-crime related details, or salient (central) 
vs. non-salient (peripheral) details in sketch descriptions of truth tellers and liars. An 
examination of such types of details could be especially relevant in investigative settings.
Furthermore, participants were given unlimited time to sketch and we did not measure 
the duration. Possible differences between truth tellers and liars with respect to time spent 
on sketching is worthwhile to investigate in the future.
Conclusions. This experiment provided additional evidence for previous research 
findings that the sketch mnemonic can be helpful in discriminating between truthful and 
deceptive accounts. The current experiment showed that truth tellers reported more infor-
mation than liars, not only immediately after the event, but also in the delayed interviews. 
In investigative practices, the sketch technique can be a useful tool in making credibility 
inferences from repeated accounts, especially if the first interview takes place shortly 
after the incident in question. Further research about the usefulness of sketch mnemonic 
to detect deceit in the delayed interviews is needed.
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